Public Law
Javad Yahyazadeh; Mohammad Mohammadi Gorgani
Abstract
Introduction
Universalism stands as a cornerstone in the realm of human rights, representing both a fundamental and contentious principle. Its significance lies in being foundational, shaping the minimal framework of international human rights law and influencing various international documents and ...
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Introduction
Universalism stands as a cornerstone in the realm of human rights, representing both a fundamental and contentious principle. Its significance lies in being foundational, shaping the minimal framework of international human rights law and influencing various international documents and declarations. However, it also sparks controversy due to the fact that human rights often reflect a specific perspective, rooted in the modern, liberal, democratic, and secular traditions of the West. It can be argued that constitutionalism, the prevailing paradigm in contemporary legal systems, is an accomplishment resulting from the historical evolution of the conceptof right, human experiences during the Age of Enlightenment, and, notably, the technological advancements spurred by the Industrial Revolution in the West.
Nonetheless, constitutionalism confronts substantial challenges in the contemporary era. For example, unamendable rules are the institution acknowledged in most constitutions. Noteworthy instances include the recognition of human dignity in Germany, republicanism and secularism in France, theocracy in Iran and Afghanistan, the separation of powers in Greece, territorial integrity in Madagascar, and political pluralism in Portugal and Romania. In “Constitutional Handcuffs,” Richard Albert, a preeminent scholar in this field, states: “The advent of the written constitution has given rise to an enduring tension in constitutional statecraft pitting constitutionalism against democracy” (2017, p. 18). However, the constitutional unamendability, facilitated through entrenchment clauses, entails the freezing of certain constitutional articles or fundamental values, potentially sidelining democratic principles and popular choice.
The present study aimed to explore the relation between constitutional unamendability and the universal values of human rights. The pivotal question revolves around whether constitutional designers have the authority to shield any value from popular amendment, potentially compromising democracy to a significant extent. The acknowledgment of a relation between the universal values in human rights and the incorporation of unamendability in the constitution would imply that constitutional designers are only allowed to entrench the universal values by superconstitutional provisions, thus imposing restrictions on democracy.
Literature Review
There are significant contributions about universality of human rights and unamendable constitutional rules. Notable among these are: the book titled Contemporary Human Rights written in Persian by Mohammad Qari Seyed Fatemi and the English paper titled “Origins and Universality in the Human Rights Debates: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalization” by Michel Goodhart (2003). Richard Albert’s outstanding book titled Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (2019) also serves as a key reference about constitutional unamendability. Despite these valuable contributions, there remains a gap in research concerning the relation between universalism of human rights and constitutional unamendability. Furthermore, it seems there is not a serious study addressing the approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this regard. Consequently, the present article stands as an innovative endeavor, as it seeks to delve into the unexplored relation and sheds light on the unique perspective of the constitutional designers in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Materials and Methods
This study falls within the category of normative legal research. Normative legal theory seeks to offer a pure, self-sufficient explanation of the law, analyzing values, concepts, principles, rules, models, and argumentations in the legal doctrine. In this line, the present analysis relied on relevant theories and doctrines to examine the relation between universalism of human rights and constitutional unamendability.
Results and Discussion
The origins of the emergence of universalism principle in contemporary human rights can be traced back to the profound debates between two trends in philosophy and ethics: deontological ethics and utilitarianism. In Kant’s philosophy, the concept of right is articulated in a manner synonymous with human rights, warranting the characterization of Kant’s philosophy as a philosophy of human rights in the exact sense of the word. Kant ascribes a transcendental status to morality, giving rise to the notions of transcendental human and universal human rights. According to Kant, moral rules grounded in duty possess absolute generality akin to natural laws; in other words, they cannot be taken as exceptions. This is where Kant introduces the concept of the absolute in his philosophy. His most explicit proposition in this context was formulated as follows: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”.
Nevertheless, the philosophical perspective of utilitarianism challenges Kant’s approach and presents thoughtful criticisms. Hegel, for instance, underscored the formal and abstract character of Kant’s philosophy, contending that social ethics finds no place in Kant’s intellectual framework. Hegel acknowledged the impracticality of Kant's philosophy, asserting its incapacity to formulate practical rules. Drawing from philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer similarly scrutinized Kant’s concept of the absolute and his idea of universalizability. Gadamer actually placed emphasis on the spatiotemporal understanding of humanity and regarded a transhistorical and transgeographical understanding as, at the very least, contentious.
Moreover, unamendable constitutional rules are those roles that are by no means subject to modification and change as understood by the founders of a given legal–political system. Essentially, the only way to amend these rules involves a fundamental transformation in the nature and foundational values of the legal–political regime. As evident, there exist shared principles regarding the substance of unamendable constitutional rules in progressive legal systems, all converging on the central notion that values emanating from constitutionalism and universalism should be entrenched and safeguarded against amendment.
Conclusion
According to the research findings, acknowledging the universality of human rights hinges on recognizing the unique nature of the human and its capacity for transhistorical and transcultural thinking. Additionally, unamendable constitutional rules, as a pivotal aspect of the constitution, pose a significant challenge to constitutionalism. Aimed at safeguarding the achievements of constitutionalism, these rules restrict citizens from exercising their right to self-determination. Examples of such rules include human dignity, fundamental rights, democracy, separation of powers, and political and religious pluralism. The present research indicated that unamendable constitutional rules in modern constitutions are the logical-cum-historical consequence of the principle of universalism, all sharing common core elements. Consequently, global constitutions are not allowed to define the content of unamendable constitutional rules as contradictory to the values of constitutionalism and universalism. This phenomenon has propelled a shift towards transnational constitutionalism. Furthermore, the research findings shed light on the approach of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article (177), in a contradictory and somewhat paradoxical stance, acknowledges certain core elements of unamendable constitutional rules aligned with the principle of universalism. Meanwhile, it recognizes several subjects, which diverge from universalism, given their distinct intrareligious and intralegal values. This inevitably necessitates efforts towards amendments and integration, propelling a move towards transnational constitutionalism.
Keywords: Universalism of Human Rights, Unamendable Constitutional Rules, Transnational Constitutionalism
Public Law
Javad Yahyazadeh; Ali Farhadian
Abstract
1. IntroductionThe most important or one of the most important concepts in the legal sciences and legal systems is the controversial concept of “right” which has a long history behind it. In the meantime, “The right to be wrong” has also entered legal texts and documents in addition ...
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1. IntroductionThe most important or one of the most important concepts in the legal sciences and legal systems is the controversial concept of “right” which has a long history behind it. In the meantime, “The right to be wrong” has also entered legal texts and documents in addition to theory. This right is the result of the growth of rights and the product of many centuries of struggle between the government and citizens in Western liberal thought and the result of various social, economic, and political happenings. The "right to be wrong" in a simple and concise sense, means respecting the conscience of others, even when we are sure they are wrong. In other words, this concept means non-interference of others in the wrongdoing of the right holder. Based on this, a person can build his moral system in such a way that, even according to others, is considered wrong, unjust, or immoral. "Right to die" or "Right to refuse medical treatment" and "Abortion", "Right to choose a racist party", and "Homosexuality" and... are some clear examples of the right to be wrong. Right to be wrong, which emphasizes the trans-ethical nature of rights by differentiating the right in the objective and subjective sense i.e., between "being right" and "having a right", reveals the content of the right in a new sense. Acknowledging the concept of having a right to be wrong in legal systems implies the acceptance of the principle of tolerance in regulating and harmonizing the legal relations of citizens and accepting the concept of "pluralism" instead of "plurality". Literature ReviewComparing the concept of the right to be wrong with the basic foundations of the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran voiced in the constitution shows that it cannot be assumed that this concept is accepted by the constitutional legislature through neither the textualist, structuralist nor intentionalist interpretation methods. Reflecting on the fourth and fifth articles, the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh in particular, the sixth paragraph of article 2, and finally the thirteenth article of the constitution, confirms the claim of the authors in this regard with a loyal and faithful interpretation of the text and the structure of the constitution. Also, referring to the constitutional negotiations documents -as an important source in understanding the fundamental rights of societies- in an attempt at an intentional interpretation, does not open a way to apply the concept of right to be wrong in this system. However, using the philosophical hermeneutic method instead of the previous interpretive methods, which seeks a dynamic interpretation of the text by understanding the "meaning of the meaning", while paying attention to the "requirements of the time", "the historicity of the text" and finally "the compromising between of the views of the author and the interpreter", makes the idea of accepting the right to be wrong in this legal order and system possible. MethodologyIn this research, in addition to clarifying the concept, the theoretical foundations and justifications of the "right to be wrong", and emphasizing its prominence and prevalence in legal systems, its possibility in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was measured and examined through the hermeneutic method. Discussion The Guardian Council, which according to Article 98, is the only official interpreter of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has prevented the possibility of using a dynamic interpretation method, especially the new hermeneutics method, and refuses to accept the right to be wrong since its establishment. This institution has only authorized and used the two methods of textual interpretation (with an emphasis on the literary meaning of the word) and intentional interpretation, in the framework of the principles of Shia jurisprudence and based on Shia’s thought system in the interpretation of the holy texts and avoiding self-serving interpretation. This has become an issue that, of course, can be revised to make the domestic legal system more efficient. Reflecting on the capacities of Imamiyyah jurisprudence in identifying the concept of the right to be wrong and its application in domestic law and constitution, of course, requires another time. ConclusionThe findings of this article show that the Islamic vision accepted in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has distinct principles regarding rights with a liberal point of view, which has manifested itself in the form of the Sharia law governing the Constitution. "God-centeredness in all matters", distinguishing between "God's right" and "people's right" and finally the supremacy of "natural rights" over "conventional rights" are unchangeable and unbreakable elements in Islamic thought. According to this view, human rights are conventional and contractual, and nature, law, and above all, human beings, do not have inherent rights. it is through God-given rights that human rights are valid. Keywords: Right, Wrong, Hermeneutics, Constitution, Islamic Republic of Iran
